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The Dynamic Analytics of
Property Law
Michael A. Heller*
The standard property trilogy of private, commons, and state has
become so outdated that it now impedes imagination and innovation
at the frontiers of ownership. This essay suggests two approaches -
creating new ideal types and synthesizing existing ones - that may help
update our static property metaphors. Using these dynamic approaches
to property analytics, legal theory can move beyond polarizing
oppositions that have made jurisprudential debates unsolvable and
rendered concrete problems invisible.
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.I
Justice Benjamin Cardozo (1926)
INTRODUCTION
Property theory scholarship works cyclically - reasoning from real-world
contests over scarce resources, to analytic tools that translate these struggles
into useful conceptual terms, to jurisprudential debates regarding the
rightness of resulting allocations, to practical politics that implement one
property regime or another, and then back to the on-the-ground struggles
which refuse to hold still. What happens if the static categories of property
scholarship have gone astray and familiar conceptual terms have failed to
keep up with emerging property relations?
Consider the familiar analytic tools of property theory: for example,
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Hanoch Dagan, Daphna
Lewinson-Zamir, Ariel Porat, and the participants at the Cegla Institute Conference
on Legal Scholarship. The University of Michigan Law School Cook Endowment
provided generous research support.
1 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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Blackstone's image of private property as "sole despotic dominion";2
Hardin's metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons;"3 and, more generally,
the division of ownership into a trilogy of private, commons, and state forms.4
Each of these concepts has a distinguished pedigree and certain present
usefulness, but each also imposes a cost when it renders new forms of property
invisible. This essay argues that property theory scholarship would benefit
from a more dynamic approach to analytics, one better suited to supporting
innovations at the frontiers of property.
I. SHOULD ANALYTICS BE DYNAMIC?
Property theorists may be impatient with a focus on analytics and may,
indeed, challenge the premise of this essay that analytics can and should be
approached more dynamically. If analytics are understood just to mean a
workable taxonomy, then little fundamental would be gained by a renewed
focus on conceptual work; indeed, analytic property theory would have
a marginal role, simply cutting and pruning the well-tended vineyard of
property terms. Further work on property concepts would quickly translate
into mind-numbing parsing of taxonomic detail in a high Germanic style.
I call this taxonomic view of property analytics the good enough approach.
According to this view, we just need a reasonably consistent and intelligible
common language of property that is good enough to sustain the more
important normative and practical debates that follow. To give an example,
note Lawrence Becker's plea for more work on pluralist justifications for
property in an article where he bluntly summarizes the current state of
theory:
What has been left undone? What has been done to death? ... [An
inquiry that has] been done enough (perhaps even overdone) ... is the
extensive recapitulation and dissection of the now-standard conceptual
analysis of property theory: Hohfeld's analysis of rights, Honor6's
2 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *2 (Univ. of Chicago
Press ed. 1979) (1765-1769).
3 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
4 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy & Frank I. Michelman, Are Property and Contract
Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711 (1980); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics
and the Law of Property, in 24 NOMOS: Ethics, Economics and the Law 3, 5-6 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Jeremy Waldron, What is Private
Property?, 5 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 313 (1985).
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analysis of ownership, and typologies of justificatory arguments.
Tinkering with these matters has become a sort of benign addiction.5
In Becker's view, an analytic addiction is at least "benign," rather than
pernicious, because "we would lose a great deal of clarity and rigor if [the
conceptual apparatus] were ignored.",6 Still, for Becker, the conceptual front
has been adequately covered - it is good enough - and the main work for
property theory lies elsewhere.
Similarly, Jeremy Waldron suggests in his jurisprudential work a good
enough approach to property analytics. As he puts it, the standard analytic
framework "respects both the technician's sensitivity to legal detail and the
philosopher's need for a set of well-understood 'ideal types' to serve as the
focus of justificatory debate."' In this view, a dynamic approach to property
analytics would be counterproductive because it would scramble the relatively
stable, transparent, and neutral-seeming ideal types that allow people to argue
productively with each other regarding more substantive issues.8
Property theorists also challenge the raison d'&re of property analytics
from the other end of the spectrum, deploying what I call the never
good enough approach. This approach rejects not just the existing analytic
framework, but also the possibility of an improved version. For example,
Thomas Grey once suggested that private property is, in the end, indefinable
in any useful or determinate way and that the categories we use to talk with
one another collapse on themselves upon closer examination.9 In this view,
property analytics, whether static or dynamic, may be understood to be about
mystifying real power relations that, in essence, resist categorization. Like
the good enough approach, the never good enough criticism does not seem to
leave much room for further work on property analytics.
So the challenge from existing property theory is substantial: to thread
between, on the one hand, a view that the taxonomies we have already are
good enough and normatively empty so further work amounts to, at best, a
5 Lawrence C. Becker, Too Much Property, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 196, 197-98 (1992).
6 Id.
7 Jeremy Waldron, Property Law, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory 3 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
8 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 4, at 331-32 ("As categories of social, economic,
or political science, it is clear that these ideas of a private property system, a
collective property system, and a common property system are very much 'ideal
typic' categories. It is also clear to quote Weber, 'none of these ideal types ... is
usually to be found in historical cases in 'pure' form."') (citing I Max Weber,
Economy and Society 216 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968)).
9 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69, 69 (1980).
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benign addiction, and, on the other hand, a position that conceptual work in
property is hopelessly indeterminate, obfuscatory, normatively pernicious,
and likely a waste of time. Between those views, I propose a more dynamic
methodology based on closely observing on-the-ground, emerging property
relations; asking whether the existing framework facilitates understanding of
and support for these new forms of ownership; and proposing new analytic
tools where the present ones fail. Because people are constantly creating
new types of property, I suggest that there remains substantial room for
analytic innovation in property scholarship, innovation which, in turn, will
carry normative punch when it redirects jurisprudential and practical debates
to new questions.
II. THE PROPERTY TRILOGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
To illustrate my argument more concretely, the discussion will focus on the
preeminent analytic tool of property theory, that is, the well-worn trilogy
of ownership forms - private, commons, and state property. While I focus
here on the trilogy, any of the other core concepts of property theory, such
as the "bundle of rights" image, could equally sustain my argument, a point
I discuss briefly in conclusion.
The trilogy of ownership forms has long formed the focal point for
normative and practical property debates.1 ° As Frank Michelman states, "We
need some reasonably clear conceptions of regimes that are decidedly not
[private property], with which [private property] can be compared."" This
process of working from ideal types pervades property theory stretching back
past Locke's discussion of the State of Nature and forward to the modem law-
and-economics debates. Today, liberals and utilitarians deploy the trilogy in
calling for a tilt towards private property; socialists disparage private property
and advocate more state control; and communitarians press for expanding
the scope of commons property. Theorists push reforms towards one type or
the other, but none subjects the trilogy itself to much challenge. The trilogy
is so entrenched as to seem almost natural, beyond serious contestation or
elaboration. Before we go about constructing new ideal types or synthesizing
existing ones, let us briefly recapitulate the trilogy itself. So, what are these
ideal types?
10 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 44 (1988).
I1 Michelman, supra note 4, at 5.
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A. Private Property
Private property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely; its boundaries
fray at the edges.1 2 For property theorists (and for ordinary layfolk 3 ), the
term seems reasonably coherent and capable of simple definition, despite
Grey's arguments.14 For example, Michelman focuses his definition on rules
for initial acquisition and reassignment. He defines sole ownership to mean
"the rules must allow that at least some objects of utility or desire can be fully
owned by just one person" and freedom of transfer to mean "owners are
immune from involuntary deprivation or modification of their ownership
rights and empowered to transfer their rights to others at will, in whole or in
part." 5 Similarly, Jeremy Waldron defines private property "around the idea
that contested resources are to be regarded as separate objects each assigned
to the decisional authority of some particular individual (or family or
firm)." 16
These standard definitions can be multiplied many times over, but all
partake of and help keep current William Blackstone's endlessly repeated
definition of private property as "that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."' 7 While
the image of sole dominion has never adequately described any real world
property ownership, as even Blackstone recognized, 8 the idea rings through
the ages and continues to block clear thinking about private property.
12 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 Yale L.J.
1163 (1999).
13 See Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 98-100 (1977)
(discussing the layperson's view of property as thing-ownership).
14 See text at supra note 9.
15 Michelman, supra note 4, at 4-5. These definitions hearken back to and build another
unsteady part of the standard conceptual apparatus of property, crystallized in the
Hohfeld-Honor6 picture of property as a "bundle of rights." Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal
Essays 96 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923); A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in Oxford Essays
in Jurisprudence 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). See also infra text accompanying notes
30-32 (discussing the bundle of rights metaphor).
16 Waldron, supra note 7, at 6.
17 Blackstone, supra note 2.
18 See Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in Early Modern Conceptions of
Property 96,96 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1996) (discussing the ever-present
thicket of restrictions Blackstone recognized in his day).
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B. Commons Property
Commons property has been the residual category that theorists usually use
when they describe a regime that is not private or state property. Michelman
defines a commons property regime as one where "there are never any
exclusionary rights. All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they
wish, and are able to do, with whatever objects (conceivably including
persons) are in the [commons]." 9 To restate, this definition means that every
individual may use any object of property and no individual has the right to
stop someone else from using the object.
Although this is not the place to elaborate the point, a useful distinction
could be drawn between the utilitarians' image of commons property and the
liberals' notion of a State of Nature: the two images share a core definition
- everyone has privileges of inclusion and no one has rights of exclusion -
but have different emphases and contexts. Liberal property theorists usually
deploy the State of Nature image to describe a pre-political commons
which then evolves towards private property;2" while the commons metaphor
of modem law-and-economists reflects their goal of explaining the marginal
evolution towards private property in specific scarce resources, such as the
enclosure of the English commons.2 For all these scholars, the transition from
commons to private property is the paradigmatic problem that property theory
seeks to explain.
19 Michelman, supra note 4, at 5.
20 See Waldron, supra note 4, at 329 ("many philosophers have used the idea of
common property to characterize the initial situation of men in relation to resources
in the so-called 'State of Nature"'); see, e.g., Blackstone, supra note 2, §§ 2-8; 2
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government at ch. V (Peter Laslett rev. ed. 1963)
(3d ed. 1698) (Of Property). Rose uncovers the contradictions that these narratives
obscure in moving across the commons/private boundary. Carol M. R6se, Property
as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory,
2 Yale J.L. & Human. 52 (1990).
21 See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study
of the American West, 12 J.L. & Econ. 163 (1975) (western land); Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 354 (1967) (fur-
trappers); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:
The Fishery, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 124 (1954); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and
Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. Legal
Stud. 41 (1986) (potlaching); Arthur F. McEvoy, The Fisherman's Problem (1986)
(fisheries); John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold
Rush, 20 J.L. & Econ. 421 (1977) (gold fields).
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C. State Property
State property, also sometimes called collective property, can be defined as
a property regime in which
[i]n principle, material resources are answerable to the needs and
purposes of society as a whole, whatever they are and however they
are determined, rather than to the needs and purposes of particular
individuals considered on their own. No individual has such an intimate
association with any object that he can make decisions about its use
without reference to the interests of the collective.22
As Jeremy Waldron notes, a state property regime is similar to commons
property in that no individual stands in a specially privileged position with
regard to any resource, but is distinguished from commons property in
that the state has a special status or distinct interest - that of owner of
all resources, able to include or exclude all individuals according to the
rules of that particular state.23 In other words, the collective, represented
usually by the state, holds all rights of exclusion and is the sole locus of
decision-making regarding use of resources. So, a subsidiary set of questions
need to be answered to specify a state property regime fully, including what
is the "collective interest" and what procedures will be used to apply that
conception to a particular case.
Today, for most property theorists, state property has become a less
and less important category, particularly since the decline of socialist
states and rise of the worldwide movement towards privatization.24
For liberal, communitarian, and utilitarian theorists alike, the trilogy may
effectively reduce down to a dichotomy - private and commons - so
that all theoretical work takes place in the interplay of these two regimes.
For example, Michelman says that a commons can be seen as "a scheme
of universally distributed, all-encompassing privilege ... that is opposite to
22 Waldron, supra note 4, at 328-29, 329 n.45; see also C.B. MacPherson, Property:
Mainstream and Critical Positions 5-6 (1978) (substantially the same definition of
state property).
23 Waldron, supra note 4, at 329.
24 Property theorists always recognize that any actual regime will contain all elements
of the trilogy we have identified, but they maintain the distinctions among the types.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1305, 1381, 1381
n.342 (1993) (noting that large U.S. cities devote about 25% of developed land to
highways and streets and 10% more to public parks); see also id. at 1397 n.413
(commenting that both law-and-economics and critical legal scholars have come to
share the view that land regimes inevitably will (and implicitly should) mix private
and public elements).
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[private property]. '25 Similarly, the economist Yoram Barzel notes that the
standard economic analysis of property has "tended to classify ownership
status into the categories all and none, the latter being termed 'common
property' - property that has no restrictions put on its use."
26
III. Two APPROACHES TO THE PROPERTY TRILOGY
The ideal-typic trilogy straight-jackets analysis. For example, when people
share access to resources in a commons and then proceed to waste the
resources through overuse, theorists see an instance of Hardin's metaphor of
the "tragedy of the commons" - another core concept of property law. By
looking to the trilogy, the liberals and utilitarians see conservation solutions
that require either privatization or state control, while communitarians search
for those limited circumstances in which close-knit groups can avoid tragedy.
The tragedy of the commons metaphor may be deployed simultaneously to
provide moral justification for private property regimes, to promote state
regulation, and to disparage the practical possibilities for cooperative use of
resources.
As we shall see, there are at least two productive ways to move beyond
the existing trilogy. First, there is what I call a constructive approach, which
responds to real world property developments by offering a new ideal type.
For example, I have developed "anticommons" property as a fourth ideal
type, a type that leads to a new set of normative questions and practical
possibilities for property. One consequence of adding this ideal type of
property to the analytic toolkit is to give voice to previously inchoate
worries about the progressive march of privatization, to explain why too
much private property can be as costly as too little. Second, the existing
trilogy can be challenged using what I call an integrative approach that brings
together elements of the existing ideal types and reveals characteristics of
them that are quite distinct. Consider here emerging property regimes
that Carol Rose identifies as "limited commons property" and property
relations that Hanoch Dagan and I call the "liberal commons" - emerging
real-world property types that constitute what we believe may be the future
25 Michelman, supra note 4, at 5, 9 ("... a scheme of universally distributed, all-
encompassing privilege is, precisely a commons, a type of regime ([state of nature])
that is opposite to [private property] ...") (italics omitted); see also Waldron, supra
note 4, at 329.
26 Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 71 (1989).
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of property. 7 The standard trilogy misses what is most distinctive, perplexing,
and important about these regimes, which is the "property governance" rules
people are creating for themselves in new ownership forms, forms not implied
either by the image of sole despotic dominion or of a commons. Let us consider
constructive and integrative approaches to property analytics in turn.
A. The Constructive Approach
While there are many ways to go outside the usual trilogy, this section will set
out just the anticommons ideal type.28 Consider new areas for property law,
such as the problem of spurring private investment in biomedical research or
creating well-functioning markets in post-socialist economies. In both cases,
recent reforms aimed to create well-functioning private property regimes, but
instead had surprising results, in part by threatening to strand resources in
wasteful uses, to deter rather than promote innovation and production. By
drawing the wrong property boundaries around resources, by fragmenting
ownership too much, it turns out that privatization can destroy resource
productivity in enduring ways. To capture these unexpected results from
excessive privatization, I have proposed the idea of anticommons property, an
image that goes beyond the old trilogy and crystallizes emerging real-world
property relations that had previously remained invisible.
Anticommons property can be best understood as the mirror image of
commons property. A resource is prone to overuse in a tragedy of the
commons when too many owners each have a privilege to use a given
resource, and no one has a right to exclude others. By contrast, a resource
is prone to underuse in a tragedy of the anticommons when multiple owners
each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has
an effective privilege of use. In theory, in a world of costless transactions,
people could always avoid common or anticommons tragedy by trading
their rights. In practice, however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming
transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases of participants,
with success more likely within close-knit communities than among hostile
27 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, I10 Yale L.J. 549
(2001); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emissions Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129 (1998).
28 The material in this section that defines anticommons property is drawn substantially
from Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998), while the biomedical research
example comes from Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998).
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strangers. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable
private property is often brutal and slow.
My definition of anticommons property is constructed in such a way as
to render it useful for describing emerging real-world property regimes.
For example, to have an anticommons I do not require that everyone hold
rights of exclusion, but only that a limited group of owners be able to block
one another. Waste through nonuse can occur even when a few actors have
rights of exclusion in a resource that each wants to use. Also, my definition
does not require that nonuse be optimal. There are many situations in which
nonuse results from excessive fragmentation, but is not socially desirable.
For most resources that people care about, some level of use is preferable to
nonuse, and an anticommons regime is a threat to, rather than the epitome of,
productive use. Finally, an anticommons may be created even when multiple
rights of exclusion are not formally granted through the legal system.
Legal and economic scholars have mostly overlooked this tragedy, in
part because it did not fit within the familiar property trilogy, but waste
through underuse can appear whenever governments create new property
rights. I developed the idea initially from closely observing privatization
in post-socialist economies. One promise of transition to markets was that
new entrepreneurs would fill stores that socialist rule had left bare. Yet after
several years of reform, many privatized storefronts remained empty, while
flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of goods, mushroomed up on the streets.
Why did the new merchants not come in from the cold? One reason was
that transition governments often failed to endow any individual with a
bundle of rights that represents full ownership. Instead, fragmented rights
were distributed to various socialist-era stakeholders, including private or
quasi-private enterprises, workers' collectives, privatization agencies, and
local, regional, and federal governments. No one could set up shop without
first collecting rights from each of the other owners.
Privatization of upstream biomedical research in the United States may
create anticommons property that is less visible than empty storefronts, but
even more economically and socially costly. In this setting, privatization
takes the form of intellectual property claims to the sorts of research results
that, in an earlier era, would have been made freely available in the public
domain. Today, upstream research in the biomedical sciences is increasingly
likely to be "private" in one or more senses of the term - supported by
private funds, carried out in a private institution, or privately appropriated
through patents, trade secrecy, or agreements that restrict the use of materials
and data. An anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely to
endure than in other areas of intellectual property because of high transaction
costs of bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and cognitive
[Vol. 2:79
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biases of researchers. But there is little public outcry to fix a biomedical
anticommons because the price people pay is in the form of lifesaving drugs
that are not discovered. Too many people hold intellectual property rights
that let them block each other from carrying out the necessary research.
Like the transition to free markets in post-socialist economies,
privatization of biomedical research offers both promises and risks. It
promises to spur private investment, but risks creating a tragedy of
the anticommons through a proliferation of fragmented and overlapping
property rights. Constructing the anticommons ideal type helps to show
why privatization must be more carefully deployed if it is to serve the
public goals of biomedical research and post-socialist transition. Otherwise,
in the biomedical context more upstream rights may lead paradoxically to
fewer useful products for improving human health, and in post-socialism,
excessive privatization can have the unintended effect of turning people
against the benefits of market reforms. Adding the idea of anticommons
property to our analytic toolkit - going beyond the familiar trilogy - helps
to reveal precisely how privatization can cause an unexpected, new form of
resource tragedy as it solves an old, familiar dilemma.
B. The Integrative Approach
By contrast, what I call the integrative approach draws new life from
existing analytic categories. Consider how property theory should treat the
striking new forms of cooperation that are emerging within common interest
residential communities. The core theoretical issues in a condominium are
not those associated with the Blackstonian image of private property in
which owners with sole despotic dominion struggle against each other -
problems traditionally covered by laws of nuisance and land use regulation.
Nor is a condominium best characterized by the waste associated with an
open access commons, a problem often resolved by state regulation. Despite
not fitting within the existing analytic boxes, common interest communities
are becoming one of the predominant forms of real property organization,
as the world becomes more crowded.
My current work with Hanoch Dagan illustrates the integrative approach to
property analytics.29 We look at the complex forms of internal self-governance
that make cooperation work in new property regimes and then abstract from
those practical solutions to re-conceptualize the private and commons ideal
types of ownership. Integrating those two forms suggests a new analytic tool,
what we call "the liberal commons." In our definition, a liberal commons is a
29 This section draws substantially from Dagan & Heller, supra note 27.
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legal regimethat enables a limited group of owners to capture the economic
and social benefits from cooperative use of a scarce resource, while also
ensuring autonomy to individual members who each retain a secure right to
exit.
The liberal commons challenges entrenched property theory built on
oppositions inherent in the existing trilogy. According to these entrenched
views, the liberal commons is an oxymoron in theory, impossible in
practice, and therefore unworthy of support by law. "Communitarians,"
who celebrate successful commons property regimes, openly promote their
illiberal character. They emphasize that restrictions on exit are essential in
a flourishing community, for only by locking people together can small,
close-knit groups develop the informal norms key to conserving commons
resources. "Privatizers" counter that breaking up commons property augurs
better for efficiency and autonomy. Most economists join this camp because
they worry that rational owners will over-consume commons resources,
while most liberals join in because they object to locking people together.
"Regulators" call for state command and control where communitarian or
privatization approaches cannot apply. For all, the opposition of commons
and private property proves an ideal foil, a shared counterpoint for
otherwise competing advocates of community, efficiency, autonomy, and
state authority.
Our approach rejects the oppositions between private and commons
property. More precisely, by integrating these types in theory and showing
how these types can work together in practice, we dissolve the "tragedy of
the commons" conundrum. The tragedy metaphor has long been understood
to refer to the problem of tragic outcomes. In recent years, communitarians
answered the outcome debate by showing that a commons can succeed, but
only in an illiberal environment. Liberals justifiably countered that illiberal
successes are still tragic and pushed for privatization. Seen through our
prism, the debate between the communitarians and the liberals relies too
heavily on false oppositions between commons and private property. Rightly
considered, their debate should be refrained in terms of the question of tragic
choice: are we doomed to choose between our liberal commitments and the
economic and social benefits available in a commons? Constructing a liberal
commons is, indeed, a challenge, but it is not inherently contradictory or
practically unattainable - though the familiar trilogy obscures the meaning
of already-existing integrative solutions.
In our view, marital property, trusts, condominiums, partnerships, and
corporations all belong under a single analytic umbrella: they can be forms
of liberal commons property. Each is a legal invention that encourages
[Vol. 2:79
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people voluntarily to come together and create limited-access and limited-
purpose communities dedicated to shared management of a scarce resource.
Each offers internal self-governance mechanisms to facilitate cooperation
and the peaceable joint creation of wealth, while simultaneously limiting
minority oppression and allowing exit. For more and more resources, the
old-fashioned image of sole private property has become impracticable,
leading people to create pervasive, though unremarked, variations on our
theme of a liberal commons.
By introducing the liberal commons as an analytic tool, we make the
already-existing liberal commons regimes more visible and more tractable
for normative and practical property theory work. For example, the idea of a
liberal commons helps draw attention to a puzzle: why is there such a sharp
contrast between existing liberal commons regimes and the unified hostility
of legal theory and default. property law to cooperation? Our analytic tool
can be deployed wherever people want to work together but are prevented
from doing so by background property rules premised on the old-fashioned
Blackstonian image of private property and the unreflective hostility to
cooperation built into the tragedy of the commons image. By showing
how a liberal commons can integrate the benefits of private and commons
forms, this dynamic approach to property analytics advances normative and
practical property projects.
C. Deploying the Two Methods
A dynamic approach to property analytics looks to the chaos of real world
relations and identifies some puzzle that is not well-captured by the existing
framework, something new, something striking - a conundrum hidden or
mis-described by the existing trilogy. While each puzzle requires its own
analytic solutions, both the constructive and integrative methods share the
key feature of starting from a concrete observation, abstracting from that
observation so that its normative and practical implications crystallize in
a new analytic tool, and then using that tool to make innovative solutions
more easily imaginable.
The two approaches also differ according to the limitations imposed
by existing analytic tools. The problem of excessive fragmentation of
property appears in what had been terra incognita, on the other side of the
spectrum of ownership from commons to private property. So, constructing
an anticommons type has the effect of putting private property in the middle
of a continuum, and the possibility of "too much" property then becomes
more visible. By contrast, the integrative method works better when the
problem is to draw out new implications from existing ideal types. For
example, Dagan and I noticed that the images of private and commons
2001]
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property had always been interpreted in opposition, but that real-world
property relations were melding the two forms together to create something
quite distinct. By identifying what we call a liberal commons, existing
private and commons property types can be re-deployed to support the gains
possible from emerging forms of cooperation in managing scarce resources.
When should a constructive approach be used? When an integrative one?
So far, I cannot discern any hard rules to govern the choice of analytics. Each
method is always available; the goal and measure of a dynamic approach to
property analytics is simplicity and persuasion.
IV. SOME FURTHER STEPS: BEYOND THE "BUNDLE OF RIGHTS"
Just as the trilogy of property forms can be usefully expanded and revised, so
can the other tools of property analytics. The idea of ownership as a "bundle
of rights" is perhaps the property concept most in need today of ambitious
constructive and integrative work. The bundle metaphor is pervasive in
property-speak. Yet while it structures large segments of theoretical and
practical debate, it poorly describes emerging property innovations and
problems.
According to the stylized history taught to generations of law students
and applied by judges every day,30 people understood property as a physical
thing or a legal thing until this century, when lawyers recast it as an abstract
bundle of legal relations. The standard Hohfeld-Honord story is a remarkably
thin account of ownership, but still rather universal. Neither the old property-
as-thing metaphor nor the current property-as-bundle metaphor conveys well
the nuanced way law structures control over scarce resources. In particular,
the idea of property-as-thing misses the complex internal relations among
owners of a thing - what Dagan and I call the liberal commons - while
the modem bundle metaphor suggests more fluidity than appears in existing
property relations. This section just briefly introduces the shift from thing to
bundle and suggests why more analytic work may be useful in moving to the
next, better-organizing metaphor.
Under the old metaphor, property involves the physical ownership of
discrete, individually-owned things, an image symbolized by the medieval
ceremony of livery of seisin, which gathered people in a field to exchange
ownership by handing over a clod of dirt. This thing-ownership metaphor is
conventionally summarized in Blackstone's talismanic quotation that private
30 The material in this section is drawn from Heller, supra note 12.
[Vol. 2:79
The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law
property is "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."'" Similarly, the idea of private property as a "legal
thing," which arises in part because ownership has no intrinsic form, has a
lineage as ancient as the image of property as a "physical thing." Fees, life
estates, easements, and leases all represent complex legal things distinct from
physical things. Although superseded in property theory, the thing-ownership
metaphor continues today as a theme in popular understanding. It is easy to
think of a house or a field or a farm as a thing because resources defined on
this scale can be put to productive use. The problem with the thing-ownership
metaphor is that it does not help identify boundaries of complex governance
arrangements and modem intangible property.
The metaphoric shift from thing-ownership to bundle of relations can be
traced to the late 1800s.32 Though its modem version is usually attributed to
Hohfeld, he never mentioned a "bundle of rights." Nevertheless, he developed
the now standard idea that property comprises a complex aggregate of social
and legal relationships made up of rights, privileges, duties, and immunities.
This vision contrasts with "the simple and nonsocial relation between a person
and a thing that Blackstone's description suggested."33 The Hohfeldian view
moved quickly from legal theory into the 1936 Restatement of Property and
from there into mainstream scholarship and judicial decision-making. For
example, the American Law of Property defines private property to be "an
aggregate of legal relations which has economic or sale value if transfer be
allowed. "'
Despite the pervasiveness of this image, I have elsewhere shown how
the open-ended bundle of property rights image can have pernicious
consequences.35 While the modem bundle of legal relations metaphor captures
the possibility of complex fragmentation, it gives a weak sense of the
31 Blackstone, supra note 2.
32 The earliest use of the term bundle of rights appears to be from John Lewis,
in his 1888 treatise The Law of Eminent Domain. See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle
of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 713 n.8 (1996) (tracing the
metaphor); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century:
The Development of the Modem Conception of Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325
(1980) (same).
33 Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in
American Legal Thought, 1776-1970, at 319 (1997).
34 6 American Law of Property § 26.1 n.15 (A. James Carter ed., 1952 & 1977 Supp.);
see also American Law Institute, Restatement of Property 2-6 (1936) (adopting a
Hohfeldian definition of property).
35 Heller, supra note 12, at-1202-21 (criticizing Supreme Court takings jurisprudence).
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"thingness" still inherent in private property. So long as property theorists
continue to rely on the modem bundle of legal relations metaphor, they
need some analytical tool to distinguish things from fragments, bundles from
rights, and private from non-private property. Lacking such a perspective has
practical consequences. For example, as I have shown, the U.S. Supreme
Court has adopted uncritically the bundle of rights view of property and used
it inadvertently to collapse the idea of private property as a distinct economic
and Constitutional category.
As the bundle of rights waxes in judicial decision-making, it is waning
in property theory. Carol Rose has proposed moving away from land to
water as a core organizing image for property;36 J.E. Penner has written
caustically that "I believe in giving dead concepts [such as the bundle of
rights metaphor] a decent burial"37; and in conversation, property scholars
Brian Simpson and Gregory Alexander concur that the time has come for
a better core metaphor. A constructive analytic approach could perhaps re-
characterize existing metaphors as Newtonian holdovers and propose moving
to something more up-to-date, such as a quantum or string-theory metaphor.
This is whimsical: to be persuasive, such a constructed term must resonate
with existing property debates while it better describes new possibilities.
Alternatively, an integrative analytic approach might look to re-describing
the familiar opposition of property as thing and property as bundle. Perhaps
we can follow Rose's lead and think through the implications of switching
from land to water. Water always conjures complex relational rights. Whether
following a constructive or integrative approach, the next step for property
analytics is to shift the debate towards new perspectives on familiar puzzles.
CONCLUSION
Ideal typical understandings of property frame the normative and practical
debates that matter. What happens if the core of what is property evolves,
mutates, refuses to hold still? For example, what if the existing trilogy of
property forms - private, commons, and state - hides tragedy and impedes
innovation at the frontiers of property? Then a more dynamic approach to
the analytics of property carries a normative punch. Beyond the standard
trilogy lies new and useful analytic tools, not just anticommons property
36 Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 329, 351
(1996) (comparing land and water as metaphors for property).
37 Penner, supra note 32, at 819.
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and the liberal commons, but also as yet unimagined property types that
will respond to new real-world property puzzles. A dynamic approach to
property analytics can deploy constructive and integrative approaches to
update the other hoary metaphors of property law, such as the bundle of
rights image.
None of the basic terms for property are stable. This is not to say
that they are meaningless or disintegrating, but that property scholarship
can gain from pushing these categories to reflect better changing on-the-
ground relations. By making property analytics more dynamic, we can move
beyond polarizing oppositions that render practical problems invisible and
jurisprudential debates unresolvable.

